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Abstract 
 
We establish 16 good practice principles in modelling defined contribution pension 
plans. These principles cover the following issues: model specification and 
calibration; modelling quantifiable uncertainty; modelling member choices; modelling 
member characteristics, such as occupation and gender; modelling plan charges; 
modelling longevity risk; modelling the post-retirement period; integrating the pre- 
and post-retirement periods; modelling additional sources of income, such as the state 
pension and equity release; modelling extraneous factors, such as unemployment risk, 
activity rates, taxes and entitlements; scenario analysis and stress testing; periodic 
updating of the model and changing assumptions; and overall fitness for purpose. 
 
 
JEL codes: C15, C18, C63, C68, D14, D91 
 
 
 
*Kevin Dowd is Professor of Finance and Economics, Durham Business School 
(kevin.dowd@hotmail.co.uk) and David Blake is Professor of Pension Economics and 
Director of the Pensions Institute, Cass Business School (d.blake@city.ac.uk).  
 
We have received valuable feedback from David A. Bell (St Davids Rd Advisory), 
Adam Butt (Australian National University), David Hutchins (AllianceBernstein), 
Robert Inglis (Financial reporting Council), Andrew Jinks (UK Pensions Regulator), 
and Andrew Storey (eValue). 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
If a defined contribution (DC) pension plan is well designed, it will be a single, 
integrated financial product that delivers at reasonable cost to the plan member a 
pension that provides a high degree of retirement income security. This pension 
should provide an adequate replacement income for the remaining life of the plan 
member (and possibly also a partner) and should remove the risk that the member 
outlives his or her resources. A well-designed plan will therefore be designed from 
back to front, that is, from desired outputs to required inputs. 
 
We have spent more than a decade thinking both about the design of DC plans and 
about modelling different aspects of the design, and, over the course of this work, we 
have conceived and built a DC pension simulation model called PensionMetrics (see 
Blake et alia (2001, 2003)). The model is stochastic which means that it involves 
underlying processes that are generated randomly and enables us to quantify 
uncertainty; this reflects that fact that the future is uncertain. We can also regard this 
model as providing what is sometimes referred to as stochastic scenario analysis. 
 
What we outline here is a set of good practice modelling principles, based on our 
experience in DC modelling, and key points are illustrated with results from the 
PensionMetrics model.  
 
To organise the discussion, we start with a simple and familiar DC pension problem; 
we then gradually add in more features to make the model more realistic. So, for 
example, we take into account specific information about a plan member such as age, 
gender, occupation, marital status, existing wealth and debts, and attitude to risk. In 
other words, we can model a plan that is tailor-made to each plan member. By also 
taking into account the member’s non-pension assets and liabilities, we can model not 
only a pension plan, but also a wealth management plan, a plan that manages the 
individual’s wealth over his or her life cycle. It is important to recognise that a formal 
pension plan is only one of the ways – albeit a key one – of providing resources in 
retirement. Here, however, we will concentrate on the pension plan. 
 
It is important to recognise that we are not offering pension planning advice nor are 
we discussing what the principles of good pension planning advice should be. Advice 
on what plan members should do is a separate matter altogether, as is the advice that 
might come from using a pension simulation model. Rather, we are concerned about 
modelling: we make a set of assumptions about economic scenarios, member 
decisions and so forth, and, based on those assumptions, the model projects the 
prospective outputs. Those projections can then be used to guide both plan design and 
member choices, but our focus is on modelling or, more particularly, with the 
principles of good modelling. We will establish these as our discussion progresses. 
 
We begin with some general comments about model specification and calibration.  
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2. Model Specification and Calibration  
 
Any DC pension model should be built using plausible assumptions about the 
stochastic processes driving key variables (such as asset prices, interest rates and 
mortality rates) and these processes should have empirically plausible calibrations. 
These calibrations would cover, inter alia, the risk premia on growth assets such as 
equities, the interest-rate process and the mortality process, over the whole time 
horizon relevant for the plan member.  
 
This time horizon will extend not just until the planned date of retirement, but until 
the member’s maximum anticipated age of death: the horizon is therefore very long. 
Thus, a plan member aged 25 will have a potential horizon of over 75 years.  
 
Key assumptions about processes and calibrations should be transparent. Such 
transparency helps ensure that the modelling process meets evolving good-practice 
standards in due diligence.  
 
 
 
 
Plan sponsors should be able to demonstrate that the processes and calibrations used 
have been considered by appropriate experts; they should also have protocols in place 
to verify or backtest model projections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Modelling Quantifiable Uncertainty 
 
DC models should aim to produce reliable projections of likely outcomes (such as the 
pension amount or replacement ratio at retirement1) and should also take account of 
the probabilities associated with projected outcomes. In short, DC models should deal 
with quantifiable uncertainty.2   
 
 
 
 
This principle implies that purely deterministic projections are highly problematic – 
and, indeed, wrong in principle.  
 
For example, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK requires plan 
sponsors to provide projections of pension fund values for hypothetical pension fund 
returns of 2%, 5% and 8%, and these have only recently been revised down from 5%, 
7% and 9%. However, such projections are highly misleading as they give no 
                                                        
1
 The ratio of the pension at retirement to the final salary before retirement.  
2
 This said, the interpretation of any results from DC models should be mindful of unquantifiable 
uncertainty – the unknown unknowns. The latter by definition always lie beyond the model’s reach, but 
are ever present and often more important.  
Principle 1: The underlying assumptions in the model should be 
plausible, transparent and internally consistent. 
Principle 2: The model’s calibrations should be appropriately audited or 
challenged, and the model’s projections should be subject to backtesting. 
Principle 3: The model must be stochastic and be capable of dealing with 
quantifiable uncertainty. 
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indication of the likelihoods or probabilities of achieving such returns. Indeed, one 
can easily get situations in which the probability of achieving an annual return of 8% 
over an extended investment horizon is essentially zero.  
 
The FCA’s requirement that plan sponsors produce such projections can therefore be 
misleading, because it can suggest to plan members that such outcomes are plausible 
when they might not be.   
 
The need to address quantifiable uncertainty suggests that the natural numerical 
method to use would be some form of stochastic simulation or Monte Carlo analysis. 
It also raises the need for suitable risk metrics. For example, a DC model might 
produce estimates of the 5th percentile point of the distribution of the simulated output 
variable of interest (this is known as the 5% value-at-risk or VaR) or estimates of the 
90% prediction interval for the output variable of interest. As we shall see below, 
these risk metrics can be illustrated graphically using a variety of charts, including 
probability density charts and fan charts.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two examples are given in Figure 1: these show the simulated pension fund at 
retirement (upper panel) and the simulated replacement ratio at retirement (lower 
panel) based on an assumed ‘base case’ and set of underlying assumptions about 
relevant driving processes and other relevant parameters (of which more below). 
 
For our base case, we assume a single male, who starts contributing to a DC pension 
plan at age 25, contributes 5% of his salary each year; his contribution is assumed to 
be supplemented by an additional 3% employer contribution and a government 
contribution (via tax relief) equal to 25% of the employee contribution. We also 
assume that he has a starting salary of £24,000, faces an ‘average’ career salary 
profile for the UK (see below) and anticipates working straight through to retirement 
at age 65. We also assume that his asset accumulation strategy is 25% in equities (and 
other growth assets) and the rest in bonds (with no de-risking glide path in the lead up 
to retirement), and that he anticipates annuitizing his pension fund at retirement, i.e., 
his anticipated decumulation strategy is to convert his pension fund into a single-life 
level annuity at the rate then prevailing.4  
 
From Figure 1, we see that the expected pension fund value at retirement is £262,000 
and the 90% prediction interval for the pension fund at retirement is [£189,000 
£368,000]. The expected replacement ratio at retirement is 43.1% of final salary, and 
the 90% prediction interval for the replacement ratio at retirement is [31.0% 57.8%]. 
                                                        
3 A good pension simulation model would also produce density charts for other output variables of 
interest, such as, pension income or annuity prices (or annuity rates) at retirement.  
4 Underlying the model is a set of other assumptions, including most notably assumptions about the 
underlying salary or real economic growth rate over the horizon period, and we assume the latter to 
follow a geometric Brownian process with a mean of 2% per annum. We will address some of the other 
assumptions presently.  
Principle 4: A suitable risk metric should be specified for each output 
variable of interest, especially one dealing with downside risk. Examples 
would be the 5% value-at-risk and the 90% prediction interval. These 
risk metrics should be illustrated graphically using appropriate charts. 
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This implies that there is a 5% probability of a retirement replacement ratio below 
31% (i.e., the 5% VaR is 31%), but also a 5% probability of a retirement replacement 
ratio above 57.8%). The pensions from DC plans are thus much more uncertain than 
those from defined benefit (DB) plans and it is important to quantify this uncertainty. 
 
Figure 1: Pension Fund Value and Replacement Ratio at Retirement 
 
Note: Results in all Figures and Tables based on the PensionMetrics model. PDF = probability density 
function. 
 
 
4. Modelling Member Choices 
 
A good model should consider the full set of choices that are available to the plan 
member. The point is to convey to the member the quantitative consequences of 
different sets of member choices to help the member come to an informed set of 
choices.  
 
Member choices would include those concerning contribution rate and prospective 
retirement age. The model should be able to answer questions such as:  How much do I need to contribute to my DC pension to get an expected 
replacement ratio of, say, 67% (which was typical of a traditional DB plan) if I 
wish to retire at, say, age 65?  If I wish to contribute 5% of my salary and get an expected replacement ratio 
of 67%, then how late will I have to work? 
In the first case, we set the contribution rate to achieve a target pension outcome, and, 
in the second, we set the retirement age to achieve the target outcome. We would also 
wish to consider different combinations of contribution rate and retirement age.  
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Some illustrative results are shown in Table 1:  Panel (a) gives us the results for our base case.   Panel (b) gives us results if we take the base case but change the employee 
contribution rate to 10%: the expected replacement ratio rises from 43.1% to 
73.2%.   Panel (c) shows what happens if we take the base case but increase the 
retirement age from 65 to 70: the expected replacement ratio increases from 
43.1% to 81.5%. A comparison of (b) and (c) suggests that the plan member 
would probably choose some combination of higher contributions and later 
retirement if he wished to improve his pension outcome.   Panel (d) shows what would happen if the plan member anticipates retiring 
early at age 60: in this case, the expected replacement ratio falls from 43.1% 
to 25.7%. A comparison of (b) and (d) shows that if he retires at 60, he gets an 
expected replacement ratio that is very much lower than what he would get if 
he worked on to 70.  
 
Table 1: Illustrative Results for the Replacement Ratio at Retirement (%) 
Lower (5%) bound Expected value Upper (95%) bound 
Panel (a): Base case 
31.0 43.1  57.8 
Panel (b): Increase contribution rate to 10% 
52.0 73.2 96.8 
Panel (c): Increase retirement age to 70 
52.2 81.5 117.0 
Panel (d): Decrease in retirement age to 60 
18.7 25.7 33.7 
 
 
There are also additional member choice issues that the DC model should address. 
These include:   The choice of asset accumulation strategy and, in particular, the risk-return 
tradeoff involved: typically, a greater allocation to growth assets (such as 
equities) will lead to a higher expected replacement ratio (or pension income), 
but also to a more dispersed (i.e., more risky) replacement ratio. Asset 
accumulation strategies should also consider suitable de-risking or glidepath 
choices as members approach retirement, such as lifestyle (or lifecycle) 
strategies or target date funds in which the pension fund gradually switches 
towards more conservative less volatile assets (such as bonds) as retirement 
approaches.   The choice of start age (e.g., what will my pension be if I delay starting my 
DC pension contributions to, say, age 30?)  The possibility of taking a contribution break (e.g., a break to raise a family or 
to return to full time education). 
Principle 5: The quantitative consequences of different sets of member 
choices and actions should be clearly spelled out to help the member 
make an informed set of decisions.  
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 The impact of changing employment (and hence a possible switch in the plan 
sponsor).  The possibility that the DC plan might involve guarantees (e.g., money-back 
guarantees or guaranteed retirement replacement ratios which attempt to 
mimic those provided by DB plans).    The effect of taking out a lump sum on retirement (e.g., to pay off a mortgage 
or go on a world cruise).  The choice of decumulation strategy and how this affects the member in 
retirement.  Family issues, such as: Do I purchase a joint-life annuity or single-life annuity 
on retirement? What likely bequest will be left if I choose drawdown rather 
than an annuity?   The possibilities associated with home equity release or reverse mortgage 
(e.g., how would equity release affect my retirement income?). 
 
Table 2: Further Illustrative Results for Replacement Ratio at Retirement (%) 
Lower (5%) bound Expected value Upper (95%) bound 
Panel (a): Base case 
31.0 43.1 57.8 
Panel (b): Increase equity weighting to 50% 
28.5 47.6 72.8 
Panel (c): Delay start of contributions to age 30 
28.2 38.4 50.9 
Panel (d): Index-linked annuity  
26.0 36.1 48.5 
Panel (e): Annuitization with level joint life annuity 
26.3 36.5 49.1 
 
The results of Table 2 illustrate some of these issues.  Again, we start with the base 
case in panel (a), but now examine a different selection of departures from this base 
case:  Panel (b) shows what happens if the equity weighting in the asset allocation 
strategy is increased from 25% to 50%: the expected replacement ratio now 
rises from 43.1% to 47.6%, but the 90% prediction interval becomes more 
dispersed (the lower bound falls from 31.0% to 28.5%, whilst the upper bound 
rises from 57.8% to 72.8%), i.e., the retirement replacement ratio becomes 
riskier.   Panel (c) shows the impact of delaying the start of contributions for 5 years: 
the expected replacement ratio falls from 43.1% to 38.4%.  Panel (d) shows the impact of changing the decumulation strategy from a level 
to an index-linked annuity: the expected retirement replacement ratio falls 
from 43.1% to 36.1%, reflecting the fact that the annuity factor5 of an index-
linked (inflation-protected) annuity is higher than that of a corresponding level 
annuity. 
                                                        
5 The annuity factor equals the present value of £1 per annum payable for life from the retirement age 
until death. If the plan member annuitizes the pension in retirement, the annual pension is found by 
dividing the pension fund by the annuity factor. 
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 Panel (e) shows the impact of having a spouse and taking out a joint life 
annuity when he retires: his expected retirement replacement ratio falls from 
43.1% to 36.5%, reflecting the fact that the annuity factor of a joint life 
annuity is higher than that of a single-life one. We assume a 50% spouse’s 
annuity on the death of the member, with the spouse assumed to be 2 years 
younger. 
 
5. Modelling Member Characteristics 
 
As well as considering member choices, a DC model should also take account of key 
member characteristics, such as occupation and gender. Occupation is important 
because of its impact on career salary profile (CSP), i.e., how the member’s salary 
evolves over his or her working life, and different occupations have different CSPs. 
Since in DC plans, contributions are generally based on a percentage of annual salary, 
it is important to know the shape of a member’s CSP in order to project his or her 
lifetime contributions into the plan. CSPs have a hump-shaped pattern with peak 
lifetime earnings occurring some time in mid or late career. The earlier in the career 
that this happens, the better it is for the retirement pension fund, since peak 
contributions will be invested for longer. Even within the same occupation, men and 
women have different shaped CSPs and hence will have different contribution 
patterns even if they start their careers on the same salary and pay the same 
contribution rate throughout their career.6 
 
A further complicating factor is the gender to use in annuity pricing, Traditionally, 
annuities in the UK and many other countries were priced using annuity tables based 
on the member’s gender, and this is what we have hitherto assumed in our base case. 
But since January 2013, countries in the EU must sell annuities on a gender-neutral or 
unisex basis. Since the life expectancy of men is lower than that of women of the 
same age, the effect of this change will be to reduce male pensions and increase 
female pensions, other things equal. We will illustrate the impact of this change.  
 
Table 3 shows occupation and gender differences in replacement ratios at retirement, 
assuming the base contribution rate and asset allocation strategy. The first two lines 
show that ignoring the CSP can make a big difference to projected retirement 
replacement ratios: for males, ignoring CSP leads to an expected retirement 
replacement ratio of 29.6% using real-gender annuity pricing and 26.7% if we use 
unisex annuity pricing, whereas assuming the average CSP across all occupations 
leads to a higher expected retirement replacement ratio of 43.1% for real-gender 
pricing and 38.9% for unisex). For females, ignoring CSP leads to an expected 
retirement replacement ratio of 24.8% (26.7% for unisex) and taking account of it 
leads to an expected replacement retirement ratio of 37.1% (40.5% for unisex).  
 
The remaining results in the Table indicate that there are major differences in 
expected retirement replacement ratios both across both occupation and gender which 
will not be captured if the member’s occupation and gender are not modelled.  
Individuals in occupations where the CSP peaks early, such as manual and personal 
service workers, do relatively well compared with those in occupations where the 
CSP peaks later, such as managerial and professional workers. In absolute terms, 
                                                        
6
 For more on the career salary profile, see Blake et alia (2007).  
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members of the latter group will have higher pensions than the former because they 
have higher salaries throughout their careers, but they still have lower replacement 
ratios. We also see, as one would expect, that differences across genders are 
substantially less with unisex rather than with real-gender annuity pricing. 
Nevertheless, the Table shows that even with unisex annuities, the replacement ratios 
of men and women are not the same since their CSPs differ. For example, male 
manual workers have a higher replacement ratio than their female counterparts on 
average because their peak earnings occur a younger age. The opposite is true for 
managers.   
 
Table 3: Occupation and Gender Differences in Replacement Ratios at 
Retirement (%) 
Occupation Male  Female 
 Real gender Unisex Real gender Unisex 
Ignore career salary 
profile 
29.6 26.7 24.8 26.7 
Average career 
salary profile 
43.1 38.9 37.1 40.5 
Manual 40.0 36.1 30.8 33.7 
Managerial 33.4 30.1 42.7 46.6 
Professional 32.0 28.9 29.1 31.8 
Clerical  35.7 32.2 31.0 33.9 
Technical 38.0 34.2 34.4 37.6 
Craft 40.6 36.7 39.0 42.6 
Personal services 47.8 43.1 32.1 35.0 
Sales 39.2 35.4 31.4 34.2 
Plant operatives 35.4 31.9 29.6 32.3 
Other 37.3 33.7 30.6 33.5 
 
A good DC model should also be able to handle other member-specific characteristics 
including, e.g., existing net wealth or debts, and the value of any pre-existing pension 
fund. The former is important for, say, younger workers with student loans to pay off. 
The latter is important for older members who might have already accumulated a 
pension fund and need to periodically reassess their evolving pension prospects as 
they move towards retirement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The final member characteristic to be considered by the model is attitude to risk, since 
this determines the member’s allocation to growth and conservative asset classes: 
more risk-tolerant members will choose a higher weight in the first asset class, while 
more risk-averse members will choose a higher weight in the second. A good DC 
model will illustrate the consequences of these decisions in terms of, say, the expected 
replacement ratio and the 5% VaR as a measure of the downside risk. Knowledge of 
these consequences might, in turn, influence other plan decisions that the member 
makes, such as the contribution rate and the planned age of retirement. For example, 
Principle 6: The model should take account of key member 
characteristics, such as occupation, gender, and existing assets and 
liabilities. 
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members who are conservative risk-averse investors might choose to increase the 
contribution rate and delay retirement. On the other hand, they might find these 
decisions unpalatable and decide instead that they are not as risk averse as they 
originally thought and so end up by choosing a higher weight to growth assets than 
they originally indicated. A good DC model will show the consequences of changing 
asset allocation, contribution rate and planned retirement date, thereby enabling the 
member to iterate towards his or her preferred combination.7   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Modelling Plan Charges 
 
We also need to take account of plan charges, which cover administrative costs and 
the fund manager fee. It is important to capture all the charges in the plan as some 
plan’s charging structures lack transparency.8  
 
Table 4: Charges and Expected Retirement Replacement Ratios 
Charge (%) Expected Retirement Replacement Ratio (%) 
0 43.1 
1 35.1 
2 28.8 
3 23.9 
 
The results in the Table show that charges make a considerable difference to 
retirement pension outcomes. As a rough rule of thumb, each increase of 1 percentage 
point in the charge leads to a reduction in the expected retirement replacement ratio 
equal to about 20% of what it would otherwise have been.  
 
There are other potential charges when a member changes jobs. There might be an 
exit charge when a member leaves a plan or moves from one plan to another. There 
might be inactivity charges, i.e., higher charges might be imposed in periods when the 
member makes no contributions to his/her pension plan or when the member leaves a 
plan but keeps the assets in the plan (i.e., becomes a deferred member).9 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 Another member characteristic related to risk attitude and is risk capacity – that is, the ability to bear 
risk given the member’s wider circumstances such family commitments, existing debts, age, etc. A 
member might have the tolerance to take risk, but might not have the capacity to do so. However, risk 
capacity should be considered in the advice process; it is not something that can be captured in a 
pension simulation model. 
8
 Blake and Board (2000). 
9
 This charge is known euphemistically as the loss of the active member discount. 
Principle 7: The model should illustrate the consequences of the 
member’s attitude to risk for the plan’s asset allocation decision. It 
should also show the consequences of changing the asset allocation, 
contribution rate and planned retirement date, thereby enabling the 
member to iterate towards the preferred combination of these key 
decision variables.   
Principle 8: The model should take into account the full set of plan 
charges.  
10 
 
 
 
 
We amend the base case going forward to incorporate an illustrative total charge of 
1%.  
 
7. Modelling Longevity Risk 
 
Another factor that should be considered is longevity risk – the impact of typically 
rising but uncertain future life expectancy. Life expectancy has been rising strongly in 
recent decades.10  The implication is that a young member will have to take this into 
account when he or she retires in 40 years’ time: annuity factors will be higher and 
this will reduce the pension at each age compared with someone of the same age 
retiring today. 
 
Table 5 shows the impact on expected retirement replacement ratios on our base case 
when one does and does not take account of longevity risk. Ignoring longevity risk, 
we get an expected retirement replacement ratio of 35.1%; taking account of it, we get 
an expected retirement replacement ratio of 28.9% i.e., a fall of 17.7% compared with 
what it would otherwise have been.  
 
As a rough rule of thumb, adding longevity risk leads to increase in annuity prices of 
about 30% over a 40 year horizon to age 65, which is equivalent to a fall in 
replacement ratios of about 30%; this in turn is equivalent to an annual increase in 
annuity prices or annual decrease in replacement ratios of about 0.75%.  
 
Table 5: Longevity Risk and Expected Retirement Replacement Ratios 
 Expected Retirement Replacement Ratio (%) 
No longevity risk 35.1 
With longevity risk 28.9 
 
 
 
 
 
We amend our base case going forward to incorporate the impact of longevity risk.  
 
 
8. Modelling the Post-Retirement Period 
 
A good DC model should project post-retirement outcomes as well as at-retirement 
pension outcomes. This is because at-retirement outcomes may not reflect outcomes 
later in retirement.  
 
To illustrate this, Figure 2 shows a fan chart for post-retirement real pension income 
in the case where the member’s decumulation strategy is to convert his pension fund 
at retirement into a level annuity. However, such an annuity gives no protection 
against inflation after retirement. Figure 2 shows that even an average inflation rate as 
                                                        
10
 For evidence, see Dowd et alia (2010).  
Principle 9: The model should take account of longevity risk and 
projected increases in life expectancy over the member’s lifetime.  
11 
 
low as 2% a year causes the member’s real pension income to halve in the period 
between retirement and his hundredth birthday, assuming he lives that long.  
 
Figure 2: Fan Chart for Post-retirement Real Pension Income: Decumulation 
Strategy with a Level Annuity
 
An alternative to conventional annuitization is index-linked annuitization, but, as we 
saw in Table 2, index-linked annuities offer a lower initial income than fixed 
annuities costing the same amount. A plan member who looked only at the at-
retirement outcomes might easily overlook the value of the inflation-protection 
provided by the index-linked annuity, whose benefit only becomes apparent later in 
retirement. Eventually, the index-linked annuity will pay out more than the fixed 
annuity if the member lives long enough. 
 
A second reason for considering the whole post-retirement period is because some 
decumulation strategies can lead to the member running out of pension income while 
still alive.11 For example, if the member chooses a drawdown decumulation strategy, 
then he or she is effectively living off the pension fund in retirement rather than 
annuitizing it and, if the drawdown rate is too high in relation to subsequent 
investment performance, the pension fund will be reduced to the point where there is 
little or nothing left to live off.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
11
 Some countries have legislation in place which prevents this happening by requiring income to be 
severely reduced before the fund actually runs out of money. 
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9. Integrating Pre- and Post-Retirement Periods 
 
It is important to consider the pre- and post-retirement periods in an integrated way.12  
The main reason for this is simple: unless one looks at both pre- and post-retirement 
outcomes, it is difficult to determine if the member’s choices are suitable ones in the 
long run.  
 
If we look across both pre- and post-retirement periods, there is also a more natural 
metric than the replacement ratio: levels of pre- and post-retirement standard of living 
(i.e., the maximum consumption expenditure that is available in each period).  
 
Figure 3 shows standard of living fan charts for both pre- and post-retirement periods 
for our amended base case. There is a noticeable jump downwards at the point of 
retirement. People tend not to welcome big cuts in their living standards, so a ‘good’ 
set of member choices will seek to avoid a big cut at retirement.13 A comparison of 
standard of living fan charts for alternative sets of choices can be used to guide the 
member towards their most appropriate set of choices. If the projected fall in 
retirement consumption is judged to be too high, the member might be encouraged to 
think in terms of a higher contribution rate, an increased equity weighting, and, 
perhaps, later retirement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
12
 See, e.g., Blake et alia (2009). 
13
 Once people retire, they often do not need as much income to live on as when they were in work – 
they do not need to pay travel costs to work, for example – so some fall in expenditure after retirement 
might be acceptable. 
Principle 10: The model should project both at-retirement pension 
outcomes and post-retirement outcomes. The risks associated with the 
following strategies should be clearly illustrated:  the risk of taking a level rather than an index-linked annuity in 
terms of a reduced standard of living at high ages  the risks associated with drawdown strategies in terms of taking 
out more from the fund initially than is justified by subsequent 
investment performance. 
Principle 11: The model should consider the pre- and post-retirement 
periods in an integrated way. This is necessary to avoid undesirable 
outcomes at a later date – such as a big fall in the standard of living in 
retirement. It will also help to determine what adjustment in member 
choices – in terms of higher contribution rate, an increased equity 
weighting and later retirement – are needed to avoid this.  
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Figure 3: Standard of Living Fan Charts 
 
 
 
 
10. Modelling Additional Sources of Income 
 
We should also consider other sources of retirement income. One such source is the 
state pension.14 While it is hard to predict what either the state pension or the state 
pension age (SPA) will be in 40 years’ time, we can anticipate that the state pension 
would be linked to average wages15 and that the SPA might be somewhere close to, 
say, 68. On the basis of these assumptions, we can add the state pension to our fan 
chart as in Figure 4. Note how the standard of living rises when the state pension is 
assumed to kick in at age 68.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
14 Another possible source of retirement income is home equity release or reverse mortgage, i.e., the 
conversion of the equity in the member’s home (if he or she owns a home) into additional income in 
retirement. To incorporate equity release, we need to make assumptions about the value of the 
member’s home, whether he or she already owns the home outright (i.e., has paid off any former 
mortgage), the type of annuity involved in the transaction (i.e., level vs. index-linked), the age at which 
the transaction is assumed to take place, and so forth. One typically gets a fairly substantial jump in 
consumption at the age when the equity release transaction takes effect.   
15
 In the UK, the state pension currently increases annually at the higher of wage inflation, price 
inflation or 2.5% - the so-called ‘triple lock’. Over the long run, we would expect the highest of these 
to be wage inflation. 
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Figure 4: Standard of Living Fan Charts: State Pension at Age 68 
 
 
As an aside, note that the age of onset of the state pension will only accidently 
coincide with the member’s retirement age in his DC pension plan: this is yet another 
reason why we need to consider outcomes over the range of pre- and post-retirement 
ages and not just those at the retirement age only.  
 
As previously mentioned, any large jumps, such as the large fall on retirement at age 
65 shown in Figures 3 and 4, are unlikely to be consistent with a ‘good’ set of 
decisions by the member. The DC model can then be used to guide the member 
through a decision-making process that leads to decisions that he or she is 
comfortable with. Thus, a well-designed DC model will be capable of being a lifetime 
financial planning tool too. 
 
There are different ways in which the member might attempt to revise his choices to 
achieve a smoother consumption profile, but one simple possibility is to increase the 
contribution rate and delay retirement. For instance, if the member increases his 
contribution rate to 8% and delays retirement to age 68, we get the standard of living 
fan charts in Figure 5. The consumption profile is much smoother than that in Figure 
4: in particular, the previous big drop at age 65 is now much ameliorated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We now amend the base case again to incorporate a contribution rate of 8% and an 
SPA of 68.  
 
Principle 12: The model should consider other sources of retirement 
income outside the member’s own pension plan. These include the state 
pension and home equity release. A well-designed DC model will also 
help with lifetime financial planning. 
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Figure 5: Standard of Living Fan Charts: Member Contribution Rate 8%, State 
Pension Age 68 and Member Retirement at Age 68 
 
 
 
11. Modelling Extraneous Factors: Unemployment Risk, Activity Rates, Taxes 
and Entitlements 
 
We have considered the most important factors in DC modelling in the previous 
sections. Here we consider some additional factors relating to both the member’s 
choices and circumstances that again make the modelling process more realistic. 
 
Examples include:  
  Unemployment risk  
 
We have assumed so far that the member anticipates working continuously 
through to retirement, but this ignores the risk of unemployment. When the 
member is unemployed, he or she is unlikely to be contributing to his pension 
plan. 
  Activity rates 
  
A related issue is the activity rate. The member might be in work but not in 
full time employment, either voluntarily or involuntarily. If the member is 
working, say, three days a week, his or her activity rate is 60%. This will 
influence the contributions going into the pension plan. In this case, we would 
assume that the member contributes 60% of an equivalent member in full time 
employment. 
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 Time out of the labour market and resulting skill changes 
  
Some members might deliberately take time out of the labour market. One 
example might someone involved in caring for a child or elderly relative. 
Another example might be someone who spends two years doing an MBA. 
Both examples involve time out of the labour market when there are no 
earnings and hence no contributions into the pension plan. However, the 
former might also involve a deterioration in skills, so that when the member 
returns to work they are on a lower salary than they would have had had they 
stayed in work. The latter case will typically involve an enhancement of skills 
and a much higher salary than the member stayed in their current job. 
   Taxes 
 
For some purposes, the member will need to make decisions that take account 
of the tax system. This will be the case with pension contributions, where 
there are tax reliefs to consider, or with wealth management, where the 
member would want, say, bequests to be made in a tax-efficient manner.  
  Welfare entitlements 
 
The model should consider welfare entitlements, such as entitlements to 
medical, care or other support in old age.16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Scenario Analysis and Stress Testing 
 
The preceding results are dependent on a range of underlying assumptions. Each set 
of assumptions constitutes a distinct scenario and we might have economic scenarios, 
investment return scenarios, mortality scenarios and so forth. It is good practice to 
consider more than one scenario and to examine how changes in scenarios might 
affect results. Of particular interest are ‘most likely’ and ‘worst case’ scenarios.17  
 
For any given scenario, one should:  Make assumptions (especially key assumptions) explicit;  Evaluate assumptions (especially key assumptions) for plausibility; and   Stress test assumptions to determine which really matter and which do not. 
This allows the modeller to determine the important assumptions and focus on 
getting them (as much as possible) ‘right’. 
 
Our key assumptions include:  
                                                        
16
 There is a further factor that will become increasingly important in future and that is long-term care. 
Ideally, pension provision and preparing for the possibility of long-term care should be treated as part 
of an integrated lifecycle plan. Currently, this is not the case either for most individuals or the state.  
17
 For more on scenario analysis, see, e.g., Dowd (2005).  
Principle 13: The model should reflect reality as much as possible and 
allow for such extraneous factors as unemployment risk, activity rates, 
taxes and welfare entitlements.  
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 An assumed mean real economic growth rate of 2%;18  An assumed mean interest rate of 4%; and  An assumed mean inflation rate of 2%.19 
 
To illustrate stress testing, let us stay with our amended base case, but for illustration 
focus on the replacement ratio at retirement. Table 6 shows the results for a variety of 
stress tests:  A reduction in the mean economic growth rate from 2% to 1% leads to a rise 
in the expected replacement ratio at retirement from 54.5% to 66.1%.20  A reduction in the mean interest rate from 4% to 3% leads the expected 
replacement ratio at retirement to fall from 54.5% to 48.9%.  A reduction in the mean inflation rate from 2% to 1% leads the expected 
replacement ratio at retirement to rise from 54.6% to 67.9%.21  A one percentage point increase in the expected returns on the risky assets 
leads the expected replacement ratio at retirement to rise from 54.6% to 
67.1%.  A one percentage point increase in the volatilities of the returns on the risky 
assets leads the expected replacement ratio at retirement to rise marginally, but 
also leads to a small but clear widening of the 90% prediction bounds.   The correlations amongst the risk assets going to zero leads to a negligible rise 
in the expected replacement ratio, but causes the 90% prediction bounds to 
widen from [35% 75.6%] to [40.6% 71.8%]. 
 
 
Table 6: Stress Test Results for the Replacement Rate at Retirement (%) 
Lower (5%) bound Expected value Upper (95%) bound 
Panel (a): Base case 
35.0 54.5 75.6 
Panel (b): Mean growth rate = 1% 
40.6 66.1 93.9 
Panel (c) Mean interest rate = 3% 
31.1 48.9 67.4 
Panel (d): Mean inflation rate = 1% 
42.5 67.9 96.2 
Panel (e): Expected returns on risk assets increase by 100 bps 
41.5 67.1 94.6 
Panel (f): Volatilities on risk assets increase by 100 bps 
33.5 54.6 78.2 
Panel (g): All correlations between risk assets = 0 
40.6 54.6 71.8 
 
                                                        
18
 This rate determines the average real growth rate in salaries. 
19
 Here investment returns are modelled using the multivariate Gaussian process and calibrations set 
out in Harrison et alia (2012), the interest and inflation rates are modelled using the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross 
(1985) model, and the mortality state variables are modelled using the age-period-cohort mortality 
model which originated in Hobcraft et alia (1982).  
20
 The replacement ratio rises because lower economic growth reduces the final salary by more than it 
reduces the value of the pension fund at retirement.  
21
 This reflects an increase in the real returns after inflation.  
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13. Periodic Updating of the Model and Changing Assumptions 
 
The model will need to be updated periodically and the assumptions changed. The 
main reasons for doing this will be:  New or revised information which requires a component of the model to be re-
estimated. An example would be the re-estimation of the career salary profiles 
following the publication a new official survey of salaries by age.  New or revised information which leads the model builder to change one or 
more assumptions in order to keep them plausible going forward. Examples 
here would be the equity premium, the long-term interest rate and the long-
term inflation rate. 
 
Such modifications should be carefully documented and explained in order to make 
sure the model retains its credibility with users. This will help to avoid any 
subsequent claim that the previous model must have been defective in some way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Fitness for Purpose 
 
Our final modelling principle is that the model should be fit for the purpose to which 
it is used.22  This is an issue of necessity and sufficiency.  
 
We would argue that the above 15 principles are necessary for a model to be fit for 
purpose. But they might not be sufficient. To assess sufficiency, we need to consider 
how the model is being used, by whom it is being used and for whom it is being used; 
and we need to do this every time the model is used. Users should also understand the 
limitations of any model that they use. 
 
 
                                                        
22
 We received very valuable feedback on an earlier draft of the paper.  The feedback could broadly be 
described as requiring the model to be fit for the purpose for which it is used.  We have therefore added 
a new modelling principle to accommodate this important insight. We would particularly like to thank 
David A. Bell, Adam Butt, David Hutchins, Robert Inglis, Andrew Jinks, and Andrew Storey for 
making this point. We will illustrate this with some examples that our correspondents kindly proposed. 
Principle 14: Scenario analysis and stress testing are important. For any 
given scenario, one should also:  Make key assumptions explicit;  Evaluate key assumptions for plausibility; and   Stress test assumptions to determine which really matter and 
which do not. This allows the modeller to determine the 
important assumptions and focus on getting them (as much as 
possible) ‘right’. 
Principle 15: The model will need to be updated periodically and the 
assumptions changed. Such modifications should be carefully 
documented and explained in order to make sure the model retains its 
credibility with users.  
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We can consider some examples:  
  Understandability of the model’s output by the end user. It is important to be 
aware that a typical member of a pension plan is unlikely to have a strong 
background in finance and might be overwhelmed by the information from a 
stochastic model if it is not presented in a manner that can be easily 
interpreted. For example, whilst the '5% value-at-risk' is likely to be 
appropriate when considering fund design, it is unlikely to be an appropriate 
risk metric to communicate to members as it is likely to be unhelpful and 
confusing to them.    Appropriate implementation of the model in a software application. The model 
must produce output quickly in real time otherwise the engagement of the end 
user will be lost. This means that an application that might be suitable as a 
best-practice design tool for a pension fund might not be a best practice tool 
for engagement and the provision of retirement financial outcome information.  The appropriate focus of the model’s stakeholders. The paper has focused on 
DC modelling at an individual member level and the importance of ensuring 
that the modelling sufficiently reflects individual circumstances. However, 
some model users might have a different focus. For example, some model 
users might wish to model DC schemes on a broader level and so might 
choose to adopt the above principles but change the focus to the trustees or 
providers. This, in turn, would mean that the model user needs to cover a wide 
spectrum of different member types across different occupations.  As another 
example, the model user might wish to use the model to assess the 
performance of a fund manager in the accumulation phase by projecting 
replacement ratios using a combination of the fund manager’s realised returns 
and the projected returns over the remainder of the accumulation phase using 
projected returns from the fund manager’s agreed benchmark portfolio. This 
emphasises the importance of all stakeholders framing their discussions and 
analyses using PensionMetrics methodology. 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Conclusion and Caveat 
 
We have set out a methodology to model the quantifiable uncertainty associated with 
DC pension plans, and have illustrated it with projections from the PensionMetrics 
model calibrated to UK data. In doing this, we have established 16 good practice 
principles in modelling DC pension plans: 
 
1. Principle 1: The underlying assumptions in the model should be plausible, 
transparent and internally consistent. 
 
2. Principle 2: The model’s calibrations should be appropriately audited or 
challenged, and the model’s projections should be subject to backtesting. 
 
Principle 16: The model should be fit for purpose.  
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3. Principle 3: The model must be stochastic and be capable of dealing with 
quantifiable uncertainty. 
 
4. Principle 4: A suitable risk metric should be specified for each output variable 
of interest, especially one dealing with downside risk. Examples would be the 
5% value-at-risk and the 90% prediction interval. These risk metrics should be 
illustrated graphically using appropriate charts. 
 
5. Principle 5: The quantitative consequences of different sets of member choices 
and actions should be clearly spelled out to help the member make an 
informed set of decisions.  
 
6. Principle 6: The model should take account of key member characteristics, 
such as occupation, gender, and existing assets and liabilities. 
 
7. Principle 7: The model should illustrate the consequences of the member’s 
attitude to risk for the plan’s asset allocation decision. It should also show the 
consequences of changing the asset allocation, contribution rate and planned 
retirement date, thereby enabling the member to iterate towards the preferred 
combination of these key decision variables.   
 
8. Principle 8: The model should take into account the full set of plan charges.  
 
9. Principle 9: The model should take account of longevity risk and projected 
increases in life expectancy over the member’s lifetime.  
 
10. Principle 10: The model should project both at-retirement pension outcomes 
and post-retirement outcomes. The risks associated with the following 
strategies should be clearly illustrated:  the risk of taking a level rather than an index-linked annuity in terms of 
a reduced standard of living at high ages;  the risks associated with drawdown strategies in terms of taking out 
more from the fund initially than is justified by subsequent investment 
performance. 
 
11. Principle 11: The model should consider the pre- and post-retirement periods 
in an integrated way. This is necessary to avoid undesirable outcomes at a 
later date – such as a big fall in the standard of living in retirement. It will also 
help to determine what adjustment in member choices – in terms of higher 
contribution rate, an increased equity weighting and later retirement – are 
needed to avoid this.  
 
12. Principle 12: The model should consider other sources of retirement income 
outside the member’s own pension plan. These include the state pension and 
home equity release. A well-designed DC model will also help with lifetime 
financial planning. 
 
13. Principle 13: The model should reflect reality as much as possible and allow 
for such extraneous factors as unemployment risk, activity rates, taxes and 
welfare entitlements. 
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14. Principle 14: Scenario analysis and stress testing are important. For any given 
scenario, one should also:  Make key assumptions explicit;  Evaluate key assumptions for plausibility; and   Stress test assumptions to determine which really matter and which do 
not. This allows the modeller to determine the important assumptions 
and focus on getting them (as much as possible) ‘right’. 
 
15. Principle 15: The model will need to be updated periodically and the 
assumptions changed. Such modifications should be carefully documented and 
explained in order to make sure the model retains its credibility with users. 
 
16. Principle 16: The model should be fit for purpose. 
 
Applying these principles will often have uncomfortable implications for plan 
members. They will often show that if members want to have a particular standard of 
living in retirement, then they will be making insufficient contributions to their 
pension plan, following a recklessly conservative investment strategy, planning to 
retire too early, or some combination of these. Practitioners have told us that revealing 
this reality to members might put them off contributing to a pension in the first place. 
We would argue that it is much better to be realistic about the future than to hide your 
head in the sand. In addition, there might be pressure to change the assumptions if the 
outcomes are not liked. This should be resisted, unless there are compelling reasons 
for doing so. 
 
We would also argue that these principles are completely coherent with the OECD 
Roadmap for the Good Design of Defined Contribution Pension Plans23 which was 
published in June 2012: 
 
1. Ensure the design of DC pension plans is internally coherent between the 
accumulation and payout phases and with the overall pension system: 
Principles 11 and 12. 
 
2. Encourage people to enrol, to contribute and contribute for long periods: 
Principle 5. 
 
3. Improve the design of incentives to save for retirement, particularly where 
participation and contributions to DC pension plans are voluntary: Principles 
6, 7, 10, 11, 12 and 13. 
 
4. Promote low-cost retirement savings instruments: Principle 8. 
 
5. Establish appropriate default investment strategies, while also providing 
choice between investment options with different risk profile and investment 
horizon: Principle 7. 
 
                                                        
23
 www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/50582753.pdf 
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6. Consider establishing default life-cycle investment strategies as a default 
option to protect people close to retirement against extreme negative 
outcomes: Principles 5 and 7. 
 
7. For the payout phase, encourage annuitization as a protection against 
longevity risk: Principle 10.  
 
8. Promote the supply of annuities and cost-efficient competition in the annuity 
market: Principle 10. 
 
9. Develop appropriate information and risk-hedging instruments to facilitate 
dealing with longevity risk: Principle 9. 
 
10. Ensure effective communication and address financial illiteracy and lack of 
awareness: Principles 3 -7 and 15. 
 
Furthermore, our principles will be useful in helping providers improve 
communications in DC pension plans. In January 2013, the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) published Good Practices on Information 
Provision for DC Schemes: Enabling Occupational DC Scheme Members to Plan for 
Retirement.24  The report shows how information can be structured and presented to 
help plan members make appropriate financial decisions on the basis of the following 
10-point checklist: 
  Preparation 
1. Have a behavioural purpose: Principles 5-13. 
2. Provide a first layer of information that answers key questions of members: 
Principle 5. 
3. Ensure information is retrievable. 
4. Ensure the information provided is comprehensible: Principles 5-13. 
 Actual drafting 
5. Optimize attention: Principles 5-13. 
6. Reduce complexity: Principles 7, 10 and 11. 
7. Provide figures that enable personal assessment and understanding: Principles 
4, 10 and 11. 
8. Show potential implications of risks and ways to deal with them: Principle 4. 
9. Support readers as much as possible towards financial decisions: Principles 5, 
7, 10, 11, 12 and 13. 
 Testing 
10. Ensure thorough testing among members. 
                                                        
24eiopa.europa.eu/fileadmin/tx_dam/files/publications/reports/Report_Good_Practices_Info_for_DC_sc
hemes.pdf 
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We end with an important caveat. It relates to the interpretation of the projections 
considered here: they are not forecasts, but rather stochastic ‘what if?’ projections that 
indicate the outcomes that might occur if the various underlying assumptions hold 
true. In other words, they tease out the outcomes implicit in the assumptions. Whether 
those assumptions later turn out to be true is entirely another matter – and the history 
of forecasting suggests that all assumptions made about the future are to a greater or 
lesser extent always false: the experience of the past suggests that the future is always 
a surprise. This should always be borne in mind when interpreting the output from 
any DC model. 
 
 
References 
 
Blake, D., and Board, J. (2000) Measuring Value Added in the Pensions Industry, 
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 25 (4), 539-567. 
 
Blake, D., Cairns, A., and Dowd, K. (2001) PensionMetrics: Stochastic Pension Plan 
Design During the Accumulation Phase, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 29, 
187-215. 
 
Blake, D., Cairns, A., and Dowd, K. (2003) PensionMetrics 2: Stochastic Pension 
Plan Design During the Distribution Phase, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 
33, 29-47.  
 
Blake, D., Cairns, A., and Dowd, K. (2007) The Impact of Occupation and Gender on 
Pensions from Defined Contributions Plans¸ Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 
32, 458-482. 
 
Blake, D., Cairns, A., and Dowd, K. (2009) Designing a Defined-Contribution Plan: 
What to Learn from Aircraft Designers, Financial Analysts Journal 65 (1), 37-42.  
 
Cox, J. C., Ingersoll, J. E., Ross, S. A. (1985) A Theory of the Term Structure of 
Interest Rates, Econometrica 53 (2), 363-384. 
Dowd, K. (2005) Measuring Market Risk. 2nd edition. Chichester: Wiley. 
Dowd, K., Blake, D., and Cairns, A. (2010) Facing up to Uncertain Life Expectancy: 
The Longevity Fan Charts, Demography 47, 67-78.  
Harrison, D., Blake, D., and Dowd, K. (2012) Caveat Venditor: The Brave New 
World of Auto-enrolment should be Governed by the Principle of Seller not Buyer 
Beware, Pensions Institute, October (pensions-
institute.org/reports/caveatvenditor.pdf). 
 
Hobcraft, J., Menken, J., and Preston, S. H. (1982) Age, Period and Cohort Effects in 
Demography: A Review, Population Index 48 (1), 4-43. 
 
